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TOpiCAL SURvEY
C. Regional Politico-Economic Integration
EEC LAW - EXPORT CREDITS - COMMUNITY HAS
EXCLUSIVE POWER TO NEGOTIATE EXPORT CREDIT
AGREEMENTS.
Local Cost Standard Advisory Opinion, Re the OECD
Understanding on a Local Cost Standard,
[1976] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 85.
For some years, the member States of the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC) have been attempting to harmonize
their export credit policies,' both among themselves and in rela-
tion to their primary non-European competitors in export trade,
the United States and Japan. Highly competitive export credit
1. Export credits are financing credits for international credit (non-cash)
transactions. For a good introduction to export credits in general and to the use
of such credits in U.S. export transactions, see Middletown, Export-Import Bank,
in A LAWYER'S GUIDE To INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 391 (1963).
Export credits, like other credits, can vary as to interest rate, term, downpayment
and various guarantee provisions. In most western nations, export transactions are
financed by governmental or quasi-governmental banking institutions. See di Nola,
The Export Credit Scramble, WORLD BUSINESS 91 (July-August 1974). The export
credit program of the United Kingdom is discussed in IMF SURVEY 82 (March 15,
1976) ; that of France, in IMF SURVEY 162 (June 7, 1976) and IMF SURVEY 194 (July
5, 1976). Although export credits are, of course, necessary ingredients of international
trade, export credit competition figures strongly as a non-tariff distortion of trade. See
BALDWIN, NONTARIFF DISTORTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADP, 50-55 (1970).
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rates have tended in the past decade to introduce significant
trade-distorting effects, which the exporting nations have been
little able to afford in view of the monetary and general economic
difficulties of the past decade.2
In the 1960s, the EEC Commission advanced its influence
primarily in the direction of the coverage of export credit insur-
ance; those efforts were unsuccessful. In the 1970s, the Com-
mission turned its efforts to the harmonization of export credits,
instituting notification requirements as to certain export credit
transactions. The Commission's harmonization schemes have
likewise been without success.3 At present, in view of Europe's
difficulties with inflation and monetary instability, the harmoni-
zation of export credits has become an important condition for
the well-being of European export industries. The Community
members can no longer afford the trade-distorting effects of an
export credit rate war.
These two means of attempting to rationalize export
credits - individual negotiations and Community negotiations -
came into collision in a local cost 4 export credit agreement nego-
tiated by the individual EEC member States within the Organiza-
tion of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The
EEC Commission asserted that the Community should be the
sole negotiator for the EEC member States in export credit
negotiations. The Commission reasoned that the Common Com-
mercial Policy clause of the Treaty of Rome5 required the member
2. Commission des Communautes Europeenes, Groupe du Porte Parole, Note
B10(76)234 aux Bureaux nationaux (23 June 1976).
3. Id. See also SEVENTH GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES IN 1973 f1434 (1974) ; EIGHTH GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES IN 1974 ff372 (1975); NINTH GENERAL REPORT ON THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES IN 1975 11422-24, 514-15 (1976).
4. "Local costs" are costs of goods and services that must be purchased in the
buyer's country in an export transaction, e.g., civil engineering, purchase of supplies,
and wages paid to local staff. The extent of financing available for local costs is a
significant variable in export credit competition. For example, that "[tihe U.S. is
more restrictive in financing local costs than some of its major competitors" has been
cited as a factor in the failure of the U.S. Export Import Bank to compete strongly
with the "government supported financing agencies of most other major industrial
nations." Statement of John H. James, Chairman, Dresser Industries, Inc., to the
President's Export Council on July 13, 1976, U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY No. 15 at N-2
(July 20, 1976).
5. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 298 U.N.T.S. 14
(1958) [hereinafter, Treaty of Rome]. The Common Commercial Policy Clause,
art. 113, is quoted infra note 10.
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States to yield their negotiating authority to the Commission
through a Council resolution. Pursuant to article 2280 of the
Treaty of Rome, the Commission sought an advisory opinion
from the Court of Justice of the European Communities to settle
the dispute over the allocation of authority to negotiate. In
the Local Cost Standard Advisory Opinion, Re the OECD Under-
standing on a Local Cost Standard,7 the Court held that the
Community had exclusive power to negotiate international
agreements concerning export credit terms, preempting the
sovereign power of the individual member States.
In spite of the Local Cost Standard opinion, conflict has con-
tinued within the community over who may negotiate a Gentle-
men's Agreement, as tentative export credit agreements have
come to be called. This paper traces the recent history of the
European role in international attempts to achieve a Gentlemen's
Agreement and analyzes the Local Cost Standard Advisory
Opinion from a legal and a political standpoint.
Because the Common Market is "biased so as to give priority
to imports,"s it has in the past been less concerned with export
policies than with import (tariff) policies. Thus the historical
Treaty-determined evolution of the Community began with the
elimination of intra-Community tariff barriers.9 It is only after
the "transitional phase" of Community development that the
Treaty of Rome calls for the establishment of a full-fledged
"common commercial policy" (art. 113).1o
6. Quoted infra note 20.
7. [1976] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 85.
8. European Report, May 4, 1976.
9. Article 8 of the Treaty of Rome provides for an orderly development of the
Common Market over a period of 12 years. Three stages of four years each are
mandated for the achievement of certain goals. For example, arts. 14 and 15 set
out the three-stage program for the reduction and elimination of customs duties
between member States. The effect of the expiration of the transition period on
December 31, 1969 is complicated by the presence of four sorts of rules within the
Treaty of Rome: (1) those which are intended to apply only during the transition
period; (2) those which are intended to apply throughout the existence of the
Community; (3) those which are intended to apply only after the expiration of the
transition period; (4) those subject to express derogations in the Treaty. The expira-
tion of the transition period does not relieve member States or the Community of the
duty of carrying out transition-period obligations that had not been completed before the
,end of the transition period. A. PARRY AND S. HARDY, EEC LAw 163 (1973).
10. 1. After the expiry of the transitional period, the common commercial policy
shall be based on uniform principles, particularly in regard to tariff amendments,
the conclusion of tariff or trade agreements, the alignment of measures of
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For a variety of reasons, the EEC members have been un-
successful in establishing a common export policy by means of
Community administrative machinery. In general, the member
States have preferred to "coordinate" export credit policies rather
than subject those policies to a rigid statutory scheme." The
aim of a common export credit policy, it is agreed, must be to
eliminate the devastating competitive bidding among the export-
ing nations. Furthermore, it is agreed that the policies of the
member States must be coordinated with the export credit policies
of the United States and Japan, the two major non-Community
exporting nations, to maintain international competitive standing
of the member States.
. A coordination group for credit insurance policies, guarantees
and financial credits was established within the EEC Commis-
sion by the Six12 to foster the exchange of information regarding
export credits.'3 Its purpose is the coordination of export credit
rates throughout the Community. Under present arrangements,
the Nine exchange information and consult on all export credit
operations having a duration of greater than five years.' The
liberalization, export policy and protective commercial measures to be taken
in cases of dumping or subsidies.
See also Article 116:
At the end of the transitional period Member States in respect of all
matters of particular interest in regard to the Common Market, within the frame-
work of any international organizations of an economic character, only proceed
by way of common action.
According to one commentator:
The commercial policy of the Community is the totality of measures which regulate
economic exchanges between the Community on the one hand and non-member
states on the other. The logic of the Common Market requires that the Member
States adopt a common approach to trade with non-members. Failure to do so
would result in distortion of trade flows, for, as barriers to the movement of
goods between Member States were removed, it would become possible for
exporters in third states to circumvent barriers to trade in force in one Member
State by exporting via a Member State which operated a less restrictive policy.
Similar considerations apply to exports from Member States to third countries.
CAMPBELL, COMMON MARKET LAW SUPPLEMENT 1975 at 940-41. See also A. PARRY
AND S. HARDY, EEC LAW at 160-61 (1973).
11. European Report, May 11, 1974.
12. "The Six" are the six original member States: Belgium, France, Germany,
Italy, Luxenbourg and the Netherlands. With the accession of Denmark, Ireland
and the United Kingdom, "the Six" have become "the Nine."
13. Council Decision of 15 May 1962, OFFICIAL GAZETTE No. 52 (30 June 1962);
Council Decision of 26 January 1965, OFFICIAL GAZETTE No. 19 (5 December 1965).
14. Id. The member States inform each other and the EEC Commission, by telex,
of all export credit transactions of longer than five years term, including informatiork
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group considers that to increase the scope of this information
flow would overburden "information circuits" and that, further-
more, arrangements of less than five years are of sufficiently
small scope that they need not be detailed at this point.' 5 In
1974 the Nine were engaged in negotiating an export credit
agreement within the Organization for Economic Coordination
and Development (OECD) ." Terms proposed by the Nine acting
in concert but outside EEC channels were:
- minimum interest rate of 7% on all export credit
operations stipulating a duration of over two years;
- maximum duration of credit of 5 years for indus-
trialized countries, 8.5 years for Eastern Europe, and 10 years
for developing countries;
- aid credits (credit on projects taking the form of
development aid) would be exempt from the common rules. 7
A proposal by the EEC Commission that the Nine be able
to block credit operations on goods and services for export to
industrialized or State-trading countries by one of the partners
failed to achieve the approval of the Nine and was shelved. In
spite of concrete proposals by the Commission, the negotiating
States within the OECD, including the Common Market States,
continued to conduct their negotiations along purely nationalistic
lines.
as to the ratios of public and private credits, the interest rate, the interest rebate,
reimbursement rate, downpayments, cost represented by credit insurance arrangements,
and contractual arrangements. A group consultation can be demanded by any member
State or by the Commission, but such a consultation cannot prevent a member State
-from following its chosen export credit policy.
15. European Report, May 11, 1974.
16. The OECD had been the forum for the negotiation and settlement of earlier,
limited export credit arrangements. The Nine adopted a common position (outside
Community channels) to conclude OECD industry-sectoral export credit programs
-on ship exports, nuclear power stations and ground stations for tele-communications
satellites. European Report, May 11, 1974. The membership of the OECD includes
the primary exporting nations, the United States, Japan, France, Germany, Italy
and the United Kingdom. The adherence of all the countries listed is necessary for
an export credit agreement to be effective; competitive behavior by any one of the
"Big Six" exporters would force the others into resuming competitive practices.
17. European Report, May 11, 1974.
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The view of the European Commission on export credits is
that:
the harmonization of export credits falls within the field of
common policies, and as such, within the ambit of article 113
of the EEC Treaty. Preparation for the international dis-
cussions . . . has been conducted within the Community
at meetings of the Policy Coordination Group for Credit
Insurance, Credit Guarantees, and Financial Credits, and
indeed this Group has drafted a text which could serve as a
basis for a "Gentlemen's Agreement." It undertook this work
on the basis of Commission suggestions. Participation in the
talks has however been by the Member States and the Com-
mission, since not all Member States accept that all aspects
of export credits are covered by article 113. The Commission
has not accepted this argument, but has been anxious on
this particular occasion, having regard to the urgency of the
issue, that such differences of opinion as exist should not be
allowed to impede progress on the substance of the matter.S
Thus the Commission's position was that it had the power to
conclude Gentlemen's Agreements but that it would not assert
the exclusive nature of its power to impede substantive negotia-
tions. At the same time the Big Four (France, United Kingdom,
Federal Republic of Germany and Italy) of the European Com-
munity continued to negotiate separately with the United States
concerning an export credit agreement. France, in particular,
claimed that Gentlemen's Agreements are not within the compe-
tence, or at least not within the exclusive competence, of the
Communities, but are strictly "governmental" (i.e., matters of
national competence) measures which the Treaty of Rome left
to the States to pursue.19
It was this factual setting that led the Commission of the
European Communities on July 14, 1975 to submit a request
pursuant to art. 22820 for an opinion to the Court of Justice of
18. Reply to written question by Mr. Klepsch, October 22, 1974, 17 0. J.
EuR. COMM. (No. C 145) 29 (1974).
19. European Report, April 6, 1974.
20. Article 228(1) of the Treaty of Rome provides:
The Council, the Commission or a member-State may obtain beforehand the
opinion of the Court of Justice as to whether an agreement envisaged is com-
patible with the provisions of this Treaty. Where the opinion of the Court of
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the European Communities. The Commission asked the Court
to rule on (1) the compatibility with the EEC Treaty of the
draft "Understanding of a Local Cost Standard," a limited ex-
port credit agreement drawn up under the auspices of the OECD
by negotiations between the Big Four and the United States
and Japan;21 and (2) whether the Community has the power
to conclude such an agreement and, if so, whether that power is
exclusive.
While these questions were before the Court - and while
the Council, the Republic of Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands and
the United Kingdom were preparing and submitting "observa-
tions" to the Court 3 - negotiations among the Big Four, the
United States and Japan proceeded apace. These negotiations
culminated in the Ramboullet Conference24 attended by the
heads of state of the Big Six25 The Rambouillet Declaration of
November 17, 1975 announced broad general agreements with
respect to currencies, trade, economic revival, energy and rela-
tions with developing countries. In paragraph 10 of the Declara-
tion, the conferees affirmed that "we will also intensify our efforts
to achieve a prompt conclusion of the negotiations now underway
concerning export credits. 2 6
In short, the EEC Commission found itself virtually shut
out of the negotiations for stabilization of export credit rates,
as did the smaller of the States of the European Communities.
Furthermore, the Commission was faced with the political reality
that the United States and Japan did not recognize the Com-
mission as the proper negotiating representative of the European
states with respect to export credits. The Commission, thus
in fact, lacked the ability or the power to negotiate an inter-
national export credit agreement on behalf of the Community.
It was against this background that the Commission requested
the opinion of the Court concerning the extent of its powers over
export credits.
Justice is adverse, the agreement may enter into force only in accordance with
Article 236 [which provides for amendments to the Treaty of Rome].
21. See text at infra note 51.
22. [1976] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 85, 86.
23. Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, art. 106, para. 1.1. See also
D. VALENTINE, 1 THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 90-91
(1965).
24. N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1975 at 1, col. 8.
25. I.e., France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States.
26. N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1975 at 1, col. 8.
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In the Local Cost Standard Advisory Opinion, Re the
OECD Understanding on a Local Cost Standard,27 the Court of
Justice of the European Communities held that the Community
has exclusive power to participate in international agreements
concerning export credit terms, preempting the sovereign power
of the individual member States. The Court's opinion was re-
quested by the Commission of the European Communities, pur-
suant to article 22828 of the Treaty of Rome, which allows the
Commission to refer to the Court questions concerning the com-
patibility of contemplated international agreements with the
Treaty. The exclusive power of the Community arises from the
Common Commercial Policy clause, article 113,29 of the Treaty,
which the Court found to embrace export credit policies.
The Local Cost Standard Advisory Opinion
There are no cited precedents in the Local Cost Standard
Advisory Opinion.0 In fact, however, the European Court had
earlier decided two cases on point. In EC Commission v. France:
Re Export Credits,3' the Court held that export credit rates fall
within community competence, and in Re The European Road
27. [1976] 1 Comm. Mkt L. R. 85.
28. Quoted supra note 20.
29. Quoted supra note 10.
30. The Court of Justice is a court in the Civil Law tradition. Although its use
of precedent differs, in theory, from that in Common Law courts, the difference is
not great in practice. See A. PARRY AND S. HARDY, EEC LAw 77-78, 91-99 (1973) ;
W. FELD, THE COURT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: NEw DIMENSION IN INTER-
NATIONAL ADJUDICATION 14-33 (1964). PARRY AND HARDY, supra at 93 assert that:
[T~he question whether a decision of the Court of Justice has validity erga omnes
is probably without content; on a narrow interpretation, the judgment has no such
validity, for it is always open to the Court of Justice to change its view, but
until it does so, that decision stands.
Following the Civil Law model, the Court of Justice also makes use of Advocates-
General. See generally D. G. VALENTINE, 1 THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES 30-35 (1965) for a discussion of the functions of the Advocates-
General. Article 63, Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice requires that judg-
ments of the Court contain, inter alia, the name of the Advocate General and an
assertion by the Court that "the Advocate General has been heard." Usually, only
one Advocate General is assigned to a case; his "Submissions" are published with
the decision. See, e.g., E. C. Commission v. France: Re Export Credits [1970] Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 43 at 46-63. In the Local Cost Standard Advisory Opinion, submissions
were received from each of the four Advocates General; those submissions were
not published with the opinion, and remain unavailable.
31. [1970] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 43.
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Transport Agreement (ERTA): EC Commission v. EC Council82
the Court set forth the criteria according to which Community
competence in international negotiations was to be decided.
EC Commission v. France: Re Export Credits"3 was an action
by the Commission against France under Article 169,1" grounded
in the Commission's claim that France had failed in its Treaty
obligations. Against France's contention that export credit rates
fall within the national monetary competence of the member
States, the Court held that export credits constituted an aid
within the Treaty and hence fell within the competence of
Community institutions.
Factually, the Banque de France had for some years set a
rate for export credits more favorable than the market rate for
internal credits. On June 12, 1968 the French Government re-
quested that the EEC Commission agree to France's maintaining
and increasing the preferential rate applied to export credits.35
On June 24 and 26, the French Government stated that it was
taking preferential measures according to articles 108 and 109
of the Treaty of Rome.88
Article 108 provides that when a country incurs difficulties
in its balance of payments, the Commission of the EEC shall
examine the situation and recommend measures for adoption by
the afflicted nation; that the Commission shall keep the EEC
Council informed of the development of the situation; that the
Council shall grant such mutual assistance and issue directives
concerning the conditions and details of the assistance; and that,
if the Council does not follow the recommendations of the Com-
mission or if the assistance is granted but the measures taken
are insufficient, then the Commission shall authorize the State
32. [1971] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 335.
33. [1970] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 43.
34. Article 169:
If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfill any
of its obligations under this Treaty, it shall give a reasoned opinion on the
matter; the State concerned must be given the prior opportunity to submit its
comments.
If such State does not comply with the terms of such opinion within the
period laid down by the Commission, the latter may refer the matter to the Court
of Justice.
35. [1970] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 43 at 46.
36. Id. at 46-51 (Submissions of the Advocate General).
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in difficulty to take protective measures, the conditions and de-
tails of which the Commission shall determine.3 7
Under article 109, if a sudden crisis occurs in a State's
balance of payments and if a Community decision is not imme-
diately forthcoming, then the State may take unilateral interim
protective measures that "shall not exceed the minimum strictly
necessary to remedy the sudden difficulties which have arisen."
Article 109 further provides that the State so acting shall inform
the Commission and other member States and that the Council,
acting on the basis of an opinionof the Commission and after
consulting with the Monetary Committee, may decide that the
State shall amend, suspend, or abolish the protective measures.
In response to France's request for authorization of prefer-
ential export credit rates, the Commission authorized the French
Government to maintain a preferential rate not to exceed a 1.5
point spread relative to the internal French credit rate. The
preferential rate was to be eliminated not later than January 21,
1969. During the relevant time period, the gap between export
and domestic rates consistently exceeded 1.5 points, and the
Commission brought an action before the Court of Justice under
article 169,38 having fulfilled the procedural prerequisites.
The French Government maintained that adjustment of ex-
port credit rates falls within the monetary policies of the member
States, and that the States' monetary policies are within their
exclusive competence; hence that the Commission's orders were
without legal basis. The Court held otherwise, reasoning that
the powers of authorization and intervention found in articles
108 and 109 would be rendered nugatory
if it were possible for member-States, under the pretext that
their action fell solely within the field of monetary policy,
to derogate unilaterally and beyond the control of those
institutions from the obligations which fall upon them from
the provisions of the Treaty.3 9
37. Cf. art. 104:
Each Member State shall pursue the economic policies necessary to ensure the
equilibrium of its overall balance of payments and to maintain confidence in its
currency, while ensuring a high level of employment and the stability of the level
of prices.
38. Supra note 34.
39. [1970] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 43, 65.
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The Court held that the preferential export credit rate consti-
tuted an aid within the meaning of article 92 of the Treaty, in
which the member States "agreed upon the incompatibility with
the Common Market of all aids given by them in any shape
which might distort or threaten to distort competition. '40 Hence,
under article 108, prior authorization of the Commission was
necessary before France could legally institute a preferential rate
on export credits.
As to the French unilateral actionunder article 109 fol-
lowing France's sudden balance of payments crisis, the Court
noted that France failed to fulfill the notification requirements
of article 109, paragraph 2. The Court opined that where the
Treaty allows even a limited derogation from Community duty,
the State derogating will be strictly held to the terms of the
Treaty.4 1
Thus the Court, finding that France had failed in one of its
obligations under the Treaty by allowing an export credit point
spread greater than that mandated by the Commission, found
that - to some extent at least - export credit levels were within
the purview of Community competence.
The leading case concerning the Community's power to con-
clude international agreements is the "ERTA" case, Re The
European Road Transport Agreement (ERTA): EC Commis-
sion v. EC Council.4 2 In the ERTA case the Commission un-
successfully sought an annulment of a Council decision regarding
the negotiations of the member States concerning the ERTA.
In 1967 negotiations were begun to review the 1962 United
Nations-sponsored ERTA, which had not yet entered into force
for lack of the requisite number of ratifications. The EEC Com-
mission sued to annul a decision taken by the EEC Council accord-
ing to which the Commission would be excluded from the ERTA
negotiations. Negotiations were to be carried on by member
States with the non-member States, and the member States
(rather than the Community) would become contracting parties.
The Council decision further mandated that the Six "act in com-
40. Id. at 65.
41. The strictness with which this provision has effect contrasts sharply with
the Court's usually indulgent attitude toward procedural requirements. See Scher-
mers, The European Court, 22 AM. J. Comp. L. 444, 447-51 (1974).
42. [1971] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 335.
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mon, coordinating their position according to the usual proce-
dure in close association with the Community institutions."
The Commission contended that exclusive power was vested
in the Community to negotiate and conclude such agreements.
The Court of Justice held on the merits that the Council's deci-
sion could stand, i.e., that the member States, on the facts of this
case, did have the power to conclude the ERTA. However, the
Court emphasized that its holding was strictly limited to the
facts, and in particular to the fact that the negotiations for the
ERTA had begun in 1962, before Community competence had
arisen through the completion of the first state of Community
development,4" and that:
At this state of the negotiations, to have suggested to the
non-member States concerned that there was now a new
distribution of powers within the Community might well have
jeopardised the successful outcome of the negotiations. 45
The legal reasoning up to the point at which the Court took
cognizance of the special circumstances that required continu-
ance of intergovernmental negotiations demonstrated the Court's
commitment to the policy of Community negotiation of inter-
national agreements that affect the common economy. The Court
adopted an essentially constitutional mode of argument.46 Thus
to the Council's argument that "since the Community has only
such authority as has been conferred on it, an authority to enter
into agreements with non-member States cannot be assumed in
43. Id. at 339 (Submissions of the Advocate General).
44. See supra note 9.
45. [1971] Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 361.
46. That the Court of Justice treats the Treaty of Rome as a constitutional
document (rather than, strictly speaking, a treaty) is well known. Judge Donner of
the Court of Justice has noted that the Court sees itself as:
confronted with the fact that it has to interpret a document which not
simply enunciated a set of rules and regulations, but which has set up a body
with a permanent responsibility for the well-being of an important segment of
industrial society. Such a document must be read and applied in a slightly dif-
ferent way than is the habit with a run-of-the-mill statute.
Donner, The Constitutional Powers of the Court of Justice of the European Com-
munities, [1974] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 127, 133. See also A. M. DONNER, THE ROLE OF
THE LAWYER IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1968), Feld & Slotnik, "Mar-
shalling" the European Community Court, 25 EMORY L.J. 317 (1976).
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the absence of an express provision in the Treaty,"47 the Court
responded:
In the absence of specific provisions of the Treaty re-
lating to the negotiation and conclusion of international
agreements in the sphere of transport policy.., one must
turn to the general system of Community law relating to
agreements with non-member States ....
To determine in a particular case the Community's au-
thority to enter into international agreements, one must have
regard to the whole scheme of the Treaty no less than to its
specific provisions. 8
The Court's reasoning was ultimately a preemption argument:
once the member States turn to the Community for the solution
of a particular problem and the Community in fact responds to
that problem by issuing Regulations, then:
This Community authority excludes the possibility of
a concurrent authority on the part of the member-States,
since any initiative taken outside the framework of the
common institutions would be incompatible with the unity
of the Common Market and the uniform application of Com-
munity law.4 9
Thus, absent special circumstances, once the member States have
yielded up some degree of initiative, the Community has the
power to conclude international agreements within the purview
of its activities. Those special circumstances here included (1)
that the negotiations had been carried on before the Community
was in a position to enter them and that the delicacy of the
negotiations could be jeopardized by switching negotiators in
the middle of negotiations; and (2) that, during the negotiations,
the Commission had failed formally to lodge its complaint of
nonrepresentation.
The Local Cost Standard Advisory Opinion0 utilized the
analytic concepts of the Export Credit decision and the ERTA
decision.
47. [1971] Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 354.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 356.
50. [1976] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 85.
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The OECD draft "Understanding on a Local Cost Standard"
required that "All officially supported contracts related to exports
on credit terms shall, save as hereinafter provided, be subject,
in respect of local costs, to the following Standard."'" The
Standard is in three parts:
(1) The participating States agree not to cover local credit
for more than 100% of the value of goods and services exported; 52
(2) "The governments further agree not to grant their sup-
port under clause 1 above for credits or credit guarantees for local
costs carrying interest rates or maturity terms more favorable
than those supported for the exports of goods and services to
which such local costs are related" ;53
(3) Local costs are defined as "expenditure for the supply of
goods and services from the buyer's country.
'54
The Understanding goes on to exclude certain transactions
(military and certain transactions where a developing country
is the importer), to define allowable derogations from the stand-
ard and the reporting mechanism for such derogation, and to
set out two general provisions:
(1) an information-exchange provision and
(2) a provision requiring review of the Understanding after
one year and allowing participating governments to withdraw on
three-months' notice.
The OECD group responsible for the Understanding issued a
statement on February 11, 1975 that all delegations were con-
sidered to have agreed to the Understanding and that, "As re-
gards the draft as a whole, there only remains to be clarified the
form of the participation in the Understanding by the European
Economic Community." 5 On December 19, 1974 the EEC Coin-
51. Id. at 87. Note that the Understanding applies only to government-supported
credits. Unsupported credits granted by private institutions are not subjected to this
regime.
52. Id. Thus if export credits are extended on a $1-million transaction covering
the full $1-million costs, additional credit for local costs may not exceed $1-million.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 88.
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mission conveyed to the EEC Council a recommendation that the
Council adopt the following decision:56
In the course of arriving at an agreement with the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development for a Local
Cost Standard, the Commission shall express the Com-
munity's position in accordance with the Directives annexed.
It shall act in accordance with the Special Committee
referred to in article 113 of the Treaty which shall assist it
in its task.57
Thus, in essence, the Commission asked the Council to give
it (the Commission) the power to enter into the Understanding.
The advisory opinion under discussion here concerns the power
of the Community to undertake such negotiations, to the exclu-
sion of the member States.
The Court took jurisdiction under article 228 (1),51 constru-
ing the term "agreements" in that article to cover the OECD
Understanding at issue. The Court considered that the Under-
standing was an agreement within the meaning of the article
because it was "an undertaking entered into by entities subject
to international law which has binding force." 59 The requirement
of binding force is satisfied because the Understanding sets forth
a standard and defines the exceptions and allowable derogations,
which implies that the Understanding is intended to bind the
participating States. Furthermore, without deciding on the com-
patibility of the terms of the Understanding with the Treaty of
56. Id. at 86. The Commission can act as negotiator for the Community only
after it has been so authorized by a decision of the Council. See art. 113(3), quoted
infra note 61. The rationale for this procedure lies in the responsibilities of the
members of the Commission and the Council: Commission members have an undivided
duty to serve the Community; they are independent of any national government (art.
157(2)). Council members, on the other hand, are representatives of their respective
national governments (art. 146). Their duty is thus jointly a duty to represent their
home government and the duty to act in the interests of the Community (art. 145).
Representation of national interests is ensured by requiring a decision of the Council
before the Commission is empowered to act as international negotiator for member
States' interests.
57. [1976] Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 87. The "Directives annexed" are the draft OECD
Understanding.
58. Supra note 19. Article 235 is the provision for amendments and modifications
of the Treaty.
59. [1976] Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 89.
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Rome, the Court provided a broad constitutional 60 mode of analy-
sis to be applied for determining compatibility:
The compatibility of an agreement with the provisions of
the Treaty must be assessed in the light of all the rules of the
Treaty, that is to say, both those rules which determine the
extent of the powers of the institutions of the Community
and the substantive rules.6'
The Court's analysis of the power of the Community to con-
clude the Understanding proceeded along constitutional lines.
The analysis began with articles 112 and 113 of the Treaty.
Article 112 provides that "Member States shall... progressively
harmonize the systems whereby they grant aid for exports to
third countries, to the extent necessary to ensure that competi-
tion between undertakings of the Community is not distorted."
Article 113 provides that "the common commercial policy shall
be based on uniform policies, particularly in regard to ... export
policy." The Court quoted articles 112 and 113 in support of its
position that export credits fall within the "aid for exports"
(art. 112) that is to be the subject of "progressive harmoniza-
tion" among the member States. This position, of course, is
consistent with the position taken in EC Commission v. France.6
The Court goes on to cite articles 11363 and 11464 to support the
proposition that
the Community is empowered, pursuant to the powers which
it possesses, not only to adopt internal rules of Community
law, but also to conclude agreements with third countries
pursuant to article 113(2) and Article 114 of the Treaty. 65
60. See supra note 46.
61. [1976] Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 90.
62. [19701 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 43. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
63. Article 113 provides, in pertinent part, that:
3. Where agreements with third countries require to be negotiated, the
Commission shall make recommendations to the Council, which will authorize the
Commission to open the necessary negotiations.
The Commission shall conduct these negotiations in consultation with a special
Committee by the Council to assist the Commission in this task and within the
framework of such directives as the Council may issue to it.
64. Article 114 provides that:
The agreements referred to in article . . . 113 shall be concluded on behalf
of the Community by the Council acting during the first two stages by unanimous
vote and subsequently by a qualified majority vote.
65. [19761 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 92.
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Without further argument, the Court thus finds Community
power to conclude the OECD Understanding.
The Court's analysis of exclusivity begins with the proposi-
tion established above, namely, that the subject matter of the
Understanding is within the scope of the "common commercial
policy prescribed by article 113 of the Treaty.""" Referring solely
to articles 113 and 114, the Court reasons its way to the proposi-
tion, "The Community has exclusive power to participate in the
Understanding on a Local Cost Standard referred to in the re-
quest for an opinion. 867 From this proposition the Court pro-
ceeded to opine that the Community's power is exclusive with
respect to export credit agreements in general, and further, that
the Community has exclusive power as to all agreements con-
cerning common commercial policy.
The Court's reasoning proceeds from constitutional principles
regarding the nature of the EEC. Exclusivity is grounded in the
fact that:
any unilateral action on the part of the Member States
would lead to disparities in the conditions for the grant of
export credits, calculated to distort competition between
undertakings of the various Member States in external mar-
kets. Such distortions can be eliminated only by means of a
strict uniformity of credit conditions granted to undertakings
in the Community, whatever their nationality. 68
From this statement it follows immediately that the Community's
power must be exclusive; for any unilateral action would result
in the likelihood of trade distortions, hence action must be multi-
lateral; but the multilateral action must embrace all the member
States, hence it is a Community action.
Critique of the Opinion
Surely, the Local Cost Standard Advisory Opinion is one of
what Judge Donner calls the constitutional decisions," resulting
from an expansive reading of the Treaty and supplying missing
express terms from the Treaty's broad language. Surely also,
the Court could have gone the path of the ERTA decision, de-
66. Id. at 93.
67. Id. at 94.
68. Id. at 93.
69. See supra note 46.
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claring that export credits had been the subject of such long nego-
tiations, predating the second stage of Community development,
that changing negotiating teams would jeopardize whatever
progress had already been made. The fact that the OECD under-
standing was already a fait accompli, complete except for ratifi-
cation, need not have influenced a Court intent on cleaving to
the safe path of the ERTA case reasoning, for the ERTA was
itself in substantially the same posture when that decision was
handed down. The Court instead moved toward continuing the
expansion of Community powers - a trend that has a long his-
tory in the actions of the European Court.70 Nevertheless, the
rigor of the Court's reasoning leaves something to be desired,
for by assuming from the beginning that export credits con-
stitute state aid under article 112, the Court assumes what must
be established. It will not be gainsaid that this proposition was
established in EC Commission v. France, Re Export Credits;7'
but the two cases are so readily distinguishable - the earlier
case involved only internal adjustment of export credits, while
the later involved an international agreement - that the proposi-
tion could well have been reversed in the Local Cost Standard
opinion. Or, should the Court not have wished to reverse its
position on the nature of export credits, it could have reasoned
that article 113, paragraph 112 is not self-executing but only
directory. The Court could have reasoned that the Community
is not automatically empowered to conclude international agree-
ments, but that the Treaty rather directs the member States
to conclude agreements themselves but within the teleologic
framework of the Community. Under this reading, article 113
(3) ,73 which authorizes the Community to negotiate with third
parties, would be taken to mean that there is a residual power
in the Community, to be invoked when the States fail to conclude
an economically necessary agreement, or that the Community
is empowered to enter only into international agreements of a
scope consonant with a more limited notion of community. Thus
the phrase "require to be negotiated" in article 113 (3) would
be taken to require a high degree of necessity or a low quantum
70. Schermers, The European Court, 22 Am. J. CoMP. L. 444, 445 (1974) ; Feld
& Slotnik, "Marshalling" the European Community Court: A Comparative Study in
Judicial Integration, 25 EMORY L.J. 317 (1976).
71. [19701 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 43.
72. Quoted supra note 10.
73. Quoted supra note 63.
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of Community participation. In short, the Court, had it so de-
sired, could have, temporarily or permanently, partially or com-
pletely, removed export credit agreements with third parties from
Community competence, leaving such agreements to the sovereign
power of the member States.
From the political circumstances surrounding the Local Cost
Standard opinion, it might be thought that the Court should have
left the member States to conclude agreements, either with the
concurrence of the Community or separately but harmoniously.
For many years the Community had been unable to arrive at a
satisfactory export credit draft agreement. The OECD agree-
ment is quite limited, and it might be argued that the Court
should not have tied the hands of the member States as to
further agreements that the Community would clearly not be
able to reach by consensus. The effects of such a decision would
subvert the Common Commercial Policy, however. First, as a
matter of economics, the big countries are able to assume greater
risks in the credit market than the smaller countries; those States
with the broadest economic base are best able to assume market
risks. Therefore, if the Community allowed the Big Four to
negotiate without the "little Five," the needs of the latter would
tend to be neglected - ultimately to the detriment of the entire
Community. In view of the likelihood of this possibility, the
Court's Local Cost Standard opinion may be seen as an attempt
to serve both the interests of the smaller States of the Community
as well as the Community itself. Nevertheless, the fact remains
that the Community has been politically unable to reach a con-
sensus with respect to export credit policies.
The greatest thrust of the Local Cost Standard opinion lies
neither in its quality as a constitutional decision nor in its effect
on export credit policy, but in its construction of the "Common
Commercial Policy" clause of article 113 of the Treaty of Rome.
Going beyond the Export Credit decision and the ERTA deci-
sion, the Court enunciated a doctrine of the enforceable com-
munity nature of commercial policies in international relations.
In so doing, the Court was not acting in a vacuum, of course; it
was instead setting goals toward which the other institutions of
the Community were already moving.74 Thus the EC Council
74. The tendency toward community has been consistently counteracted by nation-
alistic inertial tendencies, especially on the part of France. The Export Credit decision
exemplifies France's consistent attempts to retain control of policies which the Treaty
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has defined commercial exchanges, governed by articles 110 to




(iii) Common measures to deal with unfair or harmful
trading practices on the part of non-member States
(b) Export policy
(i) Aids to exports
(ii) Restrictions on exports
(iii) Export promotion
Furthermore, the ERTA case and various Council decisions make
it clear that the "power of the Member States to regulate trade
relations with non-Member States and international organizations
has passed to the Community." 76 The Local Cost Standard
opinion should be viewed as defining in part the present bounda-
ries - both with respect to jurisprudence and to economics -
of the term "trade relations," rejecting the (French) view that
monetary and credit policies are expressions of governmental
rather than Community matters, and accepting instead the view
that:
any unilateral action on the part of the member States
would lead to disparities in the conditions for the grant of
export credits, calculated to distort competition between
undertakings of the various member States in external mar-
kets. Such distortion can be eliminated only by means of a
strict uniformity of credit conditions granted to undertak-
ings in the Community, whatever their nationality.77
of Rome envisions as being within Community competence. France has also been
reluctant to incorporate EEC law into its domestic law. See Simon, Enforcement
by French Courts of European Community Law, 90 L. Q. REv. 567 (1975). The
Italian courts, on the other hand, have openly embraced Community law and make
wide use of the referral procedures under which national courts may refer questions
to the European Court. See, e.g., Amministrazione delle Finance v. S.A.C.'E. SpA,
[1975] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 267, 271-72 (Tribunale, Brescia).
75. CAMPBELL, COMMON MARKET LAW SUPPLEMENT 1975 at 941.
76. Id. at 942.
77. L1976] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 85, 93.
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There is no doubt, then, as to the consonance of the Local
Cost Standard opinion with Community goals. However, the
Community is itself a recent creation, and the prerogatives of
sovereignty are not lightly given up. It is important, there-
fore, to consider not simply jurisprudential implications of the
opinion, but its manifest practical effect as well. The Com-
munity has itself no enforcement powers similar, say, to the
enforcement powers of the United States federal government
with respect to the actions of the states that are united therein.
In the European Community, the efficacy of Community law
depends, more than in any national government, on the consent
of the governed, that is to say, on the consent of the member
States. In considering Community actions, then, one must take
account of the extent to which the member States manifest
their acquiescence; for, should the Community too grossly over-
step its bounds of competence, it runs the risk of becoming a
nullity whose decisions are ignored.
The Local Cost Standard Advisory Opinion has made little
difference, in fact, on the export credit negotiations among the
Big Six nations. On June 9, 1976, Stephen DeBrul, the President
of the U.S. Export-Import Bank (Eximbank), announced an
international consensus on export credit rates.78 The agreeing
States - the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom,
Italy, France, Japan and Canada - avoided the dictates of the
Local Cost Standard opinion by "reaching a consensus" rather
than "coming to an agreement"; in other words, the agreeing
States reached a consensus, through bilateral negotiations, 9 that
each State would unilaterally tailor its export credit guidelines
to the restrictions reached by consensus. Thus, Mr. DeBrul an-
nounced at a press briefing:
For several years you've heard a lot about a Gentlemen's
Agreement. Our announcement today encompasses some of
the general objectives of the Gentlemen's Agreement; but
it is not an agreement. Our efforts, to reach agreement, which
started over two years ago, unfortunately could not be com-
pleted at this time. And it is for this reason that we are now
acting unilaterally in making this announcement.80
78. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (B.N.A.) No. 111 at E-1, M-1 (June 15, 1976).
79. European Report - Economic and Monetary Affairs, June 18, 1976 at 1.
80. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (B.N.A.) No. 111 at M-2 (June 15, 1976).
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In spite of this disclaimer of "agreement," the formal "Declara-
tion of Official Support for Export Credits by the Export-Import
Bank of the United States"'" frankly states that the revised
terms are the result of the negotiations following the Rambouillet
Declaration and that "[f]rom these discussions a number of
guidelines have emerged which could be observed unilaterally
and which generally would result in somewhat higher minimum
interest rates on officially-supported credits from competitors and
shorter terms on some credits from Eximbank." 2 The terms
reached by these multiple bilateral negotiations limit the export
credit terms that may be supported or offered by government
banks; the effective period in which these terms are to operate is
one year, from July 1, 1976 to June 30, 1977. Hopefully at the
latter date, the major exporting nations will be able to agree
formally, within whatever administrative mechanism, to impose
further restraints on the competition for export credits. Under
the terms adhered to by Eximbank, and by the other States: 
83
1. Cash downpayments will be a minimum of 15 percent of
the export contract value.
2. The minimum blended (i.e., government-supported and
private) competitive interest rates will be not less than 8 percent
for credits over 5 years to highly developed countries, 73/4 percent
to intermediate countries, and 72 percent to the less developed
countries. Shorter-term (2 to 5 years) credits are 73/4 percent
to highly developed countries and 7 percent to all others.
3. Maximum repayment terms are 10 years to less developed
countries and 8 h years to other countries. If a credit of over
5 years duration is given to a developed country, other (un-
specified) export financing agencies will be notified in advance.
4. If Eximbank extends any of the guidelines above, it will
inform other (unspecified) agencies 7 days in advance and will
allow an additional 9 days for discussion. In addition, so-called
"credits mixes" - export credits joined with development aid -
are regulated in certain instances; (1) where the grant element
exceeds 25 percent of the credit, there is no restriction; (2) if
the grant element is less than 15 percent, notice and consultation




are required; (3) if it is between 15 and 25 percent, notification
must be made after the credit is granted. The guidelines, finally,
do not apply to agricultural commodities, aircraft, and nuclear
power plants.
In a statement before the President's Export Council, Mr.
DeBrul stated that "Eximbank's financing is somewhat less com-
petitive today than it has been, but that the recent unilateral
declarations on export credit terms should help to improve the
bank's competitive position."" The improvement in the Exim-
bank's competitive position would have been impossible had the
agencies of the other agreeing countries all made substantially
identical unilateral declarations.8 5 In addition, some of the
smaller exporting nations, for example, Sweden, Switzerland8 6
and Belgium8 7 indicated their intention to follow the terms of
the multiple unilateral declarations.8
The unilateral declarations do, however, fall short of the
original terms hoped for in the Gentlemen's Agreement negotia-
tions; with respect to most of these unachieved goals, the United
States remains at a competitive disadvantage among its export
competitors. Thus, unlike several other countries, Eximbank of-
fers no insurance against inflation or foreign exchange losses; it
is less generous in its financing of local costs than many of its
competitors; it does not provide low-cost working (pre-financing)
capital.8 9 Furthermore, at least one American businessman has
expressed doubt that the unilateral declarations would be ad-
hered to.9° It is clear that the declarations have no binding force;
in fact, because they are expressely unilateral, even their political
or moral force is unquestionably diluted. The effect of the declara-
tions will thus depend on each State's ability to withstand the
pressure to increase its competitive position by means of export
credit manipulation.
84. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (B.N.A.) No. 115 at N-1 (July 20, 1976).
85. Id.
86. European Report, June 18, 1976.
87. European Report, July 9, 1976.
88. One of the EEC's reasons for asserting community competence in export
credit negotiations was the protection of the smaller member States. The fact that
the smaller States are being drawn into the current "agreement," with little negotiating
power of their own, demonstrates the need for such protective measures.
89. Statement by John V. James, Chairman, Dresser Industries, Inc., U.S. EXPORT
WEEKLY (B.N.A.) No. 115 at N-2 (July 20, 1976).90. Id.
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While the negotiations for the consensus were occurring, the
EC Commission was not idle. During the winter of 1975-76, the
tone of the Community press releases became increasingly pes-
simistic. In a meeting of the EC Council on February 16, 1976,
France firmly refused to accede to the Court of Justice opinion;
Germany and the United Kingdom professed that they refused
to become involved in "legal wrangling," and asserted that their
only concern was to move toward concrete compromise., 1 Sir
Christopher Soames, External Affairs Commissioner of the EEC
Commission said that, despite apparent Community jurisdiction
over export credits, the Commission would never be able to get
a mandate to negotiate from the Council and that "The Commis-
sion may not like this, but.., it would have to lump it. '"92 Sir
Christopher suggested a two-pronged course of action to reassert
the jurisdiction of the Commission: once an Agreement was
formally reached, the Commission should (1) sue the member
States involved for infringing on Community prerogatives and
(2) at the same time send a proposal to the Council embodying
the substance of the Agreement.93 Sir Christopher's suggestions,
of course, do nothing for the smaller states that were excluded
from the negotiations in the first place, and in fact would force
a false consensus on the Community. Sir Christopher conceded
that such a course of action would, in fact, probably result in
a practical void in Community policy, in view of France's "out-
right opposition" to Community control of export credit rates
and of the reservations of Germany and the United Kingdom
along the same lines.94 In short, Sir Christopher suggests that
the outer limit of Community common-commercial-policy juris-
diction has probably been reached and that to attempt to force
an extension of that jurisdiction beyond those limits by calling
on the Court of Justice once again would place serious strains
on the Community's political fabric.
In July 1976, the Commission began proceedings under
article 169 of the Treaty of Rome against France, Germany, the
United Kingdom and Italy before the European Court of Justice
for infringement of the Treaty of Rome.95 Under the proceedings,
91. European Report, February 18, 1976.
92. European Report, March 6, 1976.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. European Report, July 24, 1976.
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the Commission granted the States under article 169 sixty days to
present their "observations" to the Court; the Commission
alleged that the export credit "consensus" was illegally arrived
at, in view of the Local Cost Standard Advisory Opinion." The
Commission further indicated that it would drop the action if
the member States, through the Council, would agree to the ex-
clusivity of the Community jurisdiction and allow the Commission
to propose the terms of the consensus in its own name. Such a
resolution had earlier been presented to the Council, where it was
blocked by the negative vote of France. 7
As a final Community maneuver, the European Parliament
is in the process of preparing three reports on export credits, the
Couste report on export aids, the Nyobord report on a European
Export Bank, and the Spicer report on Community competence in
external economic relations.9 8
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Local Cost Standard Advisory Opinion has
generated difficult problems for the European Community. The
Court's constitutional interpretation of the common commercial
policy clause of the Treaty of Rome has highlighted the diffi-
culties in establishing such a policy. Nevertheless, for the Com-
munity to move forward, it was no doubt necessary for the Court
to take the stance it took. Perhaps the best solution to the
export credit question would involve the creation of a European
Export-Import Bank, like the American Eximbank. However,
such an achievement may well prove impossible in the near fu-
ture, in view of France's intransigence and in view of the well-
known sluggishness of the "technocracy" of the Community. For
the present, the unilateral declarations of export credit limitations
are the firmest basis on which to build a more permanent export
credit arrangement. Any such arrangement will require the par-
ticipation of the major exporting countries of the EEC, and there
is little doubt that where the Big Four go, the smaller countries
will have to follow. At issue, then, is not whether there will be a
full-fledged Gentlemen's Agreement, but whether the Common
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Commercial Policy will arrive at its maturity. The latter question
remains at this point unpredictable.
On March 14, 1977, the finance ministers of the EEC member
States agreed to standardize export credit terms granted by
member States.99 Applicable interest rates range from 7.25 to 8
percent, depending on whether the credit is granted to a less
developed or an industrialized country; repayment terms range
from 5 to 10 years; a downpayment of 15 percent is required in
all cases; and the agreement is subject to semi-annual review.
The last provision is the only particular in which the present
agreement differs from the earlier-negotiated Gentlemen's Agree-
ment. This decision brings the EEC as a whole in line with the
Gentlemen's Agreement and the concerted unilateral export credit
arrangements. Because the decision was made as a Community
decision, any further judicial examination of the processes
whereby agreement was reached is unlikely. 00
David Simon
99. Journal of Commerce, March 15, 1977, at 10, col. 1.
100. In a recent interview, Claude Cheysson, the European Community's com-
missioner in charge of aid and development, maintained that world recovery from the
recent economic recession could best be accomplished through investment in Third
World markets. He added, however, that:
The problem with attempting recovery through such means is that it is still
being done in the old style, through export credits, which is nonsense. Those
developlng countries with their potentially huge markets already have passed
their indebtedness capacity. It is sheer hypocrisy to increase export credits to
India and such countries when we know they can't be repaid. Why pretend it is
290
